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"MAN'S BEST FRIEND": PROPERTY OR FAMILY MEMBER? AN
EXAMINATION OF THE LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF
COMPANION ANIMALS AND ITS IMPACT ON
DAMAGES RECOVERABLE FOR
THEIR WRONGFUL DEATH OR INJURY
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the United States, there is nearly one pet for every two Americans. 1
Further, approximately 124 million dogs and cats live in American households. 2 In one study, forty-five percent of dog owners reported that they
take their pets on vacation.3 Another recent survey revealed that more
than half of companion animal owners would prefer a dog or a cat to a
human if they were stranded on a deserted island.4 Another poll revealed
that fifty percent of pet owners would be "very likely" to risk their lives to
save their pets, and another thirty-three percent indicated they would be
"somewhat likely" to put their own lives in danger.5 These statistics indicate that companion animal owners view their pets as family members,
6
rather than as personal property.
According to the law, however, companion animals are considered to
be merely personal property or chattel. 7 In most jurisdictions, this classification has limited the damages that pet owners can recover when their
animals are injured or killed as a result of intentional or negligent conduct. 8 Traditionally, damages have been limited to the market value of
DAY,

1. See Richard Willing, Under Law, Pets Are Becoming Almost Human, USA ToSept. 13, 2000, at 1A (describing increase in pet population in United States).
2. See Dave Hager, Pet PoliciesLook Better As Vet Bills Rise, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS,

May 13, 2001, at J2 ("The Humane Society of the United States estimates that
Americans own more than 124 million dogs and cats.").
3. See Sarah Casey Newman, Are Heads Behind Hearts in Love for Pets?, ST. Louis
PosT-DISe'ATCH,Jan. 27, 2001, at 38 (reporting results of nationwide survey of more
than 2,000 pet owners).
4. See Willing, supra note 1, at 1A (revealing results of 1995 survey of pet
owners).
5. See Cindy Hall & Bob Laird, Risking It All for Fido, USA TODAY, June 24,
1999, at ID (illustrating importance of companion animals in lives of humans).

6. For further discussion of how humans value their animal companions, see
infra notes 99-122 and accompanying text.
7. See Debra Squires-Lee, Note, In Defense of Floyd: Appropriately Valuing Companion Animals in Tort, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1059, 1060 (1995) (recognizing that companion animals are legally defined as personal property).
8. See Kane v. County of San Diego, 83 Cal. Rptr. 19, 21-22 (Cal. Ct. App.

1969) (holding that dog owner entitled to market value of animal on day killed
plus any interest from that date); Altieri v. Nanavati, 573 A.2d 359, 361 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1989) (noting that damages in veterinary malpractice actions are normally limited to market value of animal); Columbus R.R. Co. v. Woolfolk, 58 S.E.
152, 154 (Ga. 1907) (holding that market value of dog is proper measure of dam-

(423)
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the animal.9 Some courts, however, have awarded damages based on the
animal's actual value to the owner instead of using the market value approach. 10 Other jurisdictions have awarded punitive damages in cases
where willful or wanton conduct caused a companion animal's injury or
death."' Most importantly, an overwhelming majority ofjurisdictions have
not allowed pet owners to recover damages for their emotional suffering
resulting from the wrongful injury to or death of their companion
animal. 12 Specifically, most courts have refused to permit pet owners to
13
recover damages for emotional distress or loss of companionship.
In recent years, a debate has developed concerning whether companion animal owners should be able to recover more than the market value
of their pets when their animals are injured or killed through tortious
conduct.14 At the forefront of this debate is whether pet owners should be
ages); Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 692 (Iowa 1996) (measuring
market value of dog according to purchase price, average life of breed, training
and particular traits); Miller v. Econ. Hog & Cattle Powder Co., 293 N.W. 4, 11
(Iowa 1940) (noting that damages for injury to animal are ordinarily calculated by
comparing value of animal before and after injury); Kling v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 146
So. 2d 635, 641-42 (La. Ct. App. 1962) (finding that damages for loss of fox terrier
is fair market value of animal and that no sentimental value can be considered);
Soucek v. Banham, 524 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (limiting compensatory damages for intentional killing of dog to fair market value of animal);
Greenwald v. Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. Co., 76 So. 557, 557 (Miss. 1917) (fixing
value of deceased hunting dog at market value); Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858,
864 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) ("Under Pennsylvania law, a dog is personal property.
The fundamental purpose of damages for injury to or destruction of property by
tortious conduct of another is to compensate the injured party for actual loss suffered. As in this case, where the property has been destroyed, the measure of
damages would be the value of the property prior to its destruction.") (footnote
and citation omitted); Zeid v. Pearce, 953 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997)
(recognizing that in Texas, typical recovery for death of dog is animal's market
value); see also DAVID FAVRE & PETER L. BORCHELT, ANIMAL LAW AND DOG BEHAVIOR
53 (1999) ("In all personal property injuries, the measure of damages is the
amount that will return the owner to his financial status prior to the injury. With
animals the primary focus is on fair market value ....
).
9. See FAvRE & BORCHELT, supra note 8, at 53-56 (explaining calculation of
damages based on fair market value of animal).
10. For further discussion of actual value approach, see infra notes 33-43 and
accompanying text.
11. For further discussion of punitive damage awards, see infra notes 44-47
and accompanying text.
12. See generally Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Damagesfor Killing or Injuring
Dog, 61 A.L.R.5TH 635, 650-52 (1998) (summarizing and analyzing damages recoverable for injury to or death of dog).
13. See id. at 662-66 (noting unique cases in which courts have permitted dog
owners to recover for their emotional injuries).
14. See P. Kennedy Page, The Potential Cost of Losing Fido's Company; Aggrieved
Pet Owners are Seeking Compensationfor the Loss of Their Loved Ones, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 8,
2001, at A15 (discussing whether pet owners should be compensated for loss of
society or emotional suffering when their animals are injured or killed due to negligence). Some courts have started to reconsider the manner in which they classify
companion animals. See No Need to Change the Status of Pets, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma,
Wash.), Apr. 8, 2001, at B6 (discussing tendency of some courts to characterize
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able to recover damages for genuine mental suffering. 15 Increasingly,
within this context, courts have had to consider whether companion ani6
mals should be valued more as a family member, and less as property.'
Proponents of the movement to expand damages argue that it is necessary
because of the unique and special role companion animals play in our
society. 17 Critics, however, contend that increased damages would lead to
massive litigation. 18

This Note discusses the damages recoverable for the wrongful injury
to or death of a companion animal and argues for an expansion of damages. Part II outlines the damages courts have awarded when compensating pet owners for intentional or negligent harm to their animals.' 9 Part
III analyzes the landmark cases and a recently enacted Tennessee statute
that have permitted companion animal owners to recover for their emo-

pets as more than just property). Courts must decide whether to compensate pet
owners for non-economic damages or whether to limit damages to the property
value of the animal. See id. ("If a jury finds the vets were negligent, the interesting
part of the case[s] comes next: Whether [the pet owner] can collect damages for
loss of her relationship with [the pet].").
15. See Kay Lazar, Courting a Pet Cause-Owners Push for Legal Rights of Furry
Friends, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 28, 2001, at 3 (describing one pet owner's fight for
compensation for pain and emotional distress she suffered when her two-year-old
dog was killed by utility truck).
16. See Johnson v. Douglas, 723 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001)
("[S]ome pet owners have become so attached to their family pets that the animals
are considered members of the family .... However, the law is clear that pet
owners cannot recover for emotional distress based upon an alleged negligent or
malicious destrucion of a dog .. ");see also Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627
N.W.2d 795, 798-99 (Wis. 2001) (holding that public policy precluded owner of
companion dog from recovering for emotional distress caused by killing of her
dog). In Rabideau, the court concluded that the law's classification of a dog as
personal property prohibited the pet owner from asserting a claim for the emotional distress caused by the negligent damage to her property. See id. at 798 (noting that categorization requires application of established legal doctrine). The
court refused to expand the law to allow the dog owner to maintain a claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress stemming from a mere loss of property.
See id. at 802 (finding that allowing companion animal owners to recover for their
property loss would expand law into area where there is no logical or sensible
stopping point).
17. See Sonia S. Waisman & Barbara R. Newell, Recovery of Non-Economic Damages for Wrongful Killing or Injury of Companion Animals: A Judicial and Legislative
Trend, 7 ANIMAL L. 45, 73 (2001) (emphasizing importance of allowing companion
animal owners to recover non-economic damages for wrongful injury to or death
of their animals). Waisman and Newell note the courts' recognition of the humananimal bond in marital dissolution and probate cases. See id. (arguing that bond
between human and companion animal cannot be ignored).
18. See Willing, supra note 1, at 1A (describing fear of unnecessary lawsuits if
pet owners were permitted to recover for loss of companionship and infliction of
emotional distress).
19. For further discussion of damages recoverable for the injury to or death of
a companion animal, see infra notes 24-57 and accompanying text.
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tional injuries. 20 Part IV describes the policy and psychological justifications for valuing companion animals as more than property. 2 1 Part V
analyzes how the expansion of damages would impact the veterinary profession.2 2 Finally, Part VI proposes steps that courts and legislatures could
23
take to ensure that companion animals are appropriately valued.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

Valuation of Companion Animals Based on FairMarket Value

In most jurisdictions, pet owners can only recover the fair market
value of their animals when they are injured or killed as a result of wrongful conduct. 24 Courts have used the market value approach because com25
panion animals, like all animals, are considered personal property.
According to the market value approach, the pet owner is awarded the
26
amount his pet was worth before the injury or death.
The market value approach involves a calculation of damages based
upon the animal's pedigree, purchase price, general health and unique
traits. 27 Ultimately, any factor that affects a pet's commercial value will be
20. For further discussion of the statute and cases that have permitted pet
owners to recover for their emotional injuries, see infra notes 58-98 and accompanying text.
21. For further discussion ofjustifications for increasing valuation of pets, see
infra notes 99-135 and accompanying text.
22. For further discussion of ramifications on the veterinary profession, see
infra notes 136-77 and accompanying text.
23. For further discussion of proposals for courts and legislatures, see infra
notes 178-201 and accompanying text.
24. See Peter Barton & Frances Hill, How Much Will You Receive in Damagesfrom
the Negligent or IntentionalKilling of Your Pet Dog or Cat? 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rv. 411-12
(1989) (explaining market value as primary measure of damages for death of pet
dog or cat). Under the market value approach, damages are often so minimal that
it does make sense for pet owners to file lawsuits. See id. at 411 (noting that it is not
always in pet owner's interest to sue offending party). Because of the low potential
for large recovery, many lawyers are unwilling to represent pet owners in these
cases. See Kenneth D. Ross & Thomas Kanyock, If You Suspect Veterinay Malpractice ... , at http://www.aldf.org/vetmal.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2001) (offering
guidance to pet owners who fall victim to veterinary malpractice). Pet owners have
the option to go to small claims court if they are unable to afford an attorney or if
it does not make economic sense to acquire one. See id. (discussing option of small
claims court). Recovery in small claims court is generally limited to out-of-pocket
expenses. See id. (articulating potential recovery in small claims court).
25. See Barton & Hill, supra note 24, at 411 (reporting courts' classification of
companion animals as property).
26. See FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 8, at 53 ("In all personal property injuries, the measure of damages is the amount that will return the owner to his financial status prior to the injury.").
27. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Watson, 94 So. 551, 554 (Ala. 1922)
(finding that consideration of dog's special qualities is proper in determining
dog's market value); Stettner v. Graubard, 368 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685 (Town Ct. 1975)
("[R]elevant factors to be considered ... include the dog's age, health, breed,
training, usefulness and any special traits or characteristics of value. Sentiment,
however, may not be considered since that often is as much a measure of the
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considered in the damage award. 28 Under the market value approach, pet
owners must present evidence proving the fair market value of their com29
panion animal.
The market value approach does not consider the special value a
companion animal may have to its individual owner. 30 In fact, this approach does not recognize any attachment between a human and his or
her pet.3 1 The valuation method "relies instead on what amount the
animal would be worth to a stranger acting as a willing buyer in an arm's
32
length transaction for fungible goods."
B.

Valuation of Companion Animals Based on Actual Value of Pet to Owner

Courts that do not use the market value system calculate damages
based on the actual value of the companion animal to its owner. 33 This
owner's heart as it is the dog's worth."); see also FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 8, at
54 (explaining elements that comprise market value).
28. See FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 8, at 54 (noting that any factor that
affects commercial value changes valuation computation).
29. See Burgreen Contracting Co. v. Goodman, 314 So. 2d 284, 294-95 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1975) (finding that information relating to value of animal can be given
by expert with sufficient knowledge of animal); Wells v. Brown, 217 P.2d 995, 99798 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950) (affirmingjury verdict of $1,500 in negligent killing of dog
even though purchase price was only $300 because of expert testimony by third
party familiar with particular breed); Demeo v. Manville, 386 N.E.2d 917, 918 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1979) (discussing evidence that pet owner may introduce to prove value
of his or her companion animal); Ponder v. Angel Animal Hosp., Inc., 762 S.W.2d
846, 847 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that dog owner failed to prove any loss in
dog's value where veterinarian mistakenly neutered animal brought to veterinary

hospital); see also FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 8, at 54 (describing presentation

of evidence). Expert testimony is normally needed to prove the market value of
the animal to the court. See id. (describing use of expert testimony). The market
value calculations are done on a case by case basis and are ultimately a jury decision. See id. (noting role of jury in damage assessment). In many cases, it is difficult to find an accurate method to determine the market value. See Barton & Hill,
supra note 24, at 413-15 (discussing problems with market value approach).
30. See Barton & Hill, supra note 24, at 415 (assessing flaws of market value
approach).
31. See GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALs, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 55 (1995)
(describing limitations of market value approach). Francione argues that the market value approach fails to satisfactorily compensate many pet owners. See id. (recognizing that many pet owners would never contemplate selling their pets because
of emotional attachment they have with their animals). The same scholar suggests
that the main reason the market value approach is still widely used is because it is
most capable of proof. See id. at 61 (stating that awards usually depend on market
value of animal).
32. Id. at 55.
33. See Zeiner v. Spokane Int'l R.R., 300 P.2d 494, 499 (Idaho 1956) (explaining that value of personal property to individual owner is proper measure of damages when possession has no market value); Wilcox v. Butt's Drug Stores, Inc., 35
P.2d 978, 979 (N.M. 1934) (declaring that dog's market value is not proper measure of damages when animal possesses no true market value); McDonald v. Ohio
State Univ. Veterinary Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 750, 752 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1994) (deciding
actual value of dog based on animal's age, training and accomplishments). In Mc-
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approach is primarily used in cases where the animal has no market value
or where market value is not a true indication of its worth.34 This valuation system goes beyond simple market value analysis and recognizes the
special value of pets to their owners. 35 In most cases, under this valuation
3 6
approach, an animal's actual value increases as the animal ages.
In theory, this method of calculation appears beneficial to pet owners
because it recognizes the unique relationship between companion animals
and their owners.3 7 In practice, however, the damage awards have typically been as minimal as they are under the market value approach.3 8 The
sparse damage awards are primarily due to the fact that courts still view
companion animals as property, and damage awards reflect this
39
classification.
Donald, an owner of a show dog brought a negligence suit against a veterinary
hospital after the animal suffered irreversible paraplegia and paralysis of the hind
limbs after receiving negligent surgery. See id. at 751 (describing factual basis of
lawsuit). After a trial was conducted on the sole issue of damages, the court
awarded $5,000 to the owner for the injury to the show dog. See id. at 752 (noting
specifics of damage award). In calculating damages, the court considered the time
and effort involved in training the dog, its unique pedigree and loss of stud fees.
See id. (explaining elements of damage award). Courts have considered how far
they should extend the actual value approach. See Jankoski v. Preiser Animal
Hosp., Ltd., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1086-87 (Il. App. Ct. 1987) (determining that dog's
value to its owner is proper measure of damages when market value cannot be
determined). In Jankoski, the court found that the actual value to the owner can
include some element of sentimental value, but emphasized that there was no independent cause of action for loss of companionship for the death of a pet. See id.
at 1087 ("The concept of actual value to the owner may include some element of
sentimental value in order to avoid limiting the plaintiff to merely nominal
damages.").
34. See McDonald, 644 N.E.2d at 752 (recognizing that actual value of property
to owner is sometimes better standard than market value). The McDonald court
emphasized that the market value standard is not a "shackle" and promoted the
use of the actual value approach in appropriate circumstances. See id. (citing
Bishop v. East Ohio Gas Co., 56 N.E.2d 164, 166 (Ohio 1944)) (noting use of
actual value standard when market value cannot be ascertained).
35. See FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 8, at 58 (discussing alternative to market value approach). Courts and commentators have alternatively termed this category of damages as the 'intrinsic value' formula. See Barton & Hill, supra note 24,
at 416-21 (analyzing intrinsic value approach). "The term 'intrinsic' focuses on the
animals as an [sic] individuals as well as their relationships to human possessors/
owners." FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 8, at 58.
36. See Barton & Hill, supra note 24, at 416 (analyzing damages based on actual or intrinsic value of pet).
37. See FRANCIONE, supra note 31, at 58 (noting that intrinsic value recognizes
attachment between companion animal and its owner). Some scholars claim that
valuation based on actual value is too subjective and difficult to measure. See Barton & Hill, supra note 24, at 419 (analyzing whether sentimental value should be
component of damages).
38. See FRANCIONE, supra note 31, at 58 (recognizing low damage awards based
on actual value of animal).
39. See Barton & Hill, supra note 24, at 421 ("[T]he damages have been as low
as the damages awarded using the market value method and are therefore
inadequate.").
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A long-term feeling of loss of the animal's companionship frequently
follows the death of a pet. 40 For this reason, one court expanded recoverable damages under the actual value approach by allowing loss of companionship to be included as a component of value. 41 Justification for loss of
companionship rests on the theory that it "would be wrong not to acknowledge the companionship" that is lost when an animal is wrongfully killed
or injured.4 2 Nevertheless, most courts have not permitted loss of companionship to be included in damage awards for the wrongful injury to or
43
death of a companion animal.
C.

Punitive Damage Awards for the Wrongful Injury to or Death of
Companion Animals

Some courts have allowed the recovery of punitive damages in cases
where the person causing harm to the companion animal engaged in conduct that was malicious, willful or in reckless disregard of the rights of the
animal and the pet owner. 44 "Punitive damages are not meant to compen40. See, e.g., FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 8, at 64 (describing emotional
injuries suffered when pet dies). For a further discussion of the emotional effects
on a pet owner from the death of his or her companion animal, see infra notes
123-35 and accompanying text.
41. See Brousseau v. Rosenthal, 443 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980)
(recognizing loss of companionship as element of dog's actual value). In Brousseau, a woman boarded her eight-year-old dog at a kennel. See id. at 285 (describing factual basis of negligence suit). When she returned to the kennel two weeks
later she was told that her dog had died. See id. (establishing facts). The court
found that the defendant's failure to return the bailed dog, combined with the
defendant's lack of an explanation for the dog's death, established negligence. See
id. at 286 (describing general law applying to bailees of animals). The court concluded that loss of companionship should be included as an element of the dog's
actual value and awarded the woman $550 plus costs and disbursements. See id. at
287 (awarding judgment for pet owner). The Brousseau case clearly stands in the
minority because most courts do not allow loss of companionship to be a component of a damage award for a property loss. See Klein v. St. Louis Transit Co., 93
S.W. 281, 282-83 (Mo. Ct. App. 1906) (finding that loss of dog's companionship
and deprivation of pleasure should not be considered in damage award for wrongful death of animal).
42. See Brousseau, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 286-87 (describing reasons for allowing loss
of companionship as element of damages).
43. See Gluckman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(finding no independent cause of action for loss of companionship of pet); see also
Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858, 864-65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that dog
owner not entitled to damages for loss of companionship upon death of animal).
The Daughen court noted that companionship is included in the idea of consortium, the right growing out of a marriage giving each spouse "the right to the
companionship, society and affection of each other in their life together." See id.
at 865 (defining consortium). The court concluded that under no circumstances
would it be valid to allow recovery for loss of companionship for the death of an
animal. See id. (finding no claim for loss of companionship).
44. See Levine v. Knowles, 197 So. 2d 329, 332 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (allowing claim for punitive damages based on defendant's conduct); Wilson v. City
of Eagan, 297 N.W.2d 146, 151 (Minn. 1980) (permitting award of punitive damages based on dog warden's killing of cat because such killing displayed willful
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sate an owner for injury to his or her property, but to punish the person
causing the injury for his or her unacceptable conduct." 45 In determining
the proper punitive damage award the court will consider the following:
(1) degree of malice, (2) amount needed to deter such conduct, (3)
wealth of the perpetrator, (4) sentimental value of the animal and (5)
degree of pain and suffering of the pet owner. 46 Some courts are reluctant to allow the recovery of punitive damages because of the absence of a
physical injury to the human owner and because of the law's classification
47
of companion animals as property.
D.

Emotional Distress Damagesfor Wrongful Injury to or Death of
Companion Animals

Most courts have refused to compensate companion animal owners
for their mental distress when their pets are injured or killed. 48 The pri-

mary reason is that companion animals are considered property, and damages for mental distress for injury to or loss of property are not
disregard for law and property rights of citizens). In Knowles, the court allowed a
claim for punitive damages when the defendant cremated a dog that died while in
his possession, even though the plaintiffs specifically requested that the dog's body
be kept intact for an autopsy. See Knowles, 197 So. 2d at 331-32 (allowing claim for
punitive damages). In permitting the punitive damages award the court stated
that the "doctrine of punitive damages makes the desired admonitory function of
certain tort actions more effective than it would if money judgments were always
limited to reparation." Id. at 331. The court further found, "[t]hat the conduct
which gives rise to punitive damages need be willful, wanton, reckless, malicious or
oppressive to guard against allowance of punitive damages in cases where there is
no admonitory function .

.

. " Id.

45. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 8, at 58.
46. See Companion Animal Wrongful Death or Injury Cases-An Introduction,
Animal Legal Defense Fund, at http://www.aldf.org/damages.htm (last visited
Aug. 25, 2001) (noting elements courts will consider in determining whether to
award punitive damages in cases where companion animals are wrongfully
harmed).
47. See Soucek v. Banham, 524 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that pet owner cannot recover punitive damages for loss of pet because owner
merely suffered property damage).
48. SeeJason v. Parks, 638 N.Y.S.2d 170, 171 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (holding
that dog owner cannot recover damages for emotional distress caused by wrongful
death of animal as result of veterinary malpractice); Strawser v. Wright, 610 N.E.2d
610, 612 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) ("We sympathize with one who must endure the
sense of loss which may accompany the death of a pet; however, we cannot ignore
the law .

. .

. Ohio law simply does not permit recovery for serious emotional

distress which is caused when one witnesses the negligent injury to or destruction
of one's property."); Rowbotham v. Maher, 658 A.2d 912, 913 (R.I. 1995) (holding
that claim for recovery under negligent infliction of emotional distress was unavailable to companion animal owner whose dog was wrongfully killed); Zeid v. Pearce,
953 S.W.2d 368, 369-70 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that pet owner cannot recover damages for pain and suffering or mental anguish in veterinary malpractice
lawsuit); Julian v. DeVincent, 184 S.E.2d 535, 536 (W. Va. 1971) (explaining general rule that damages for sentimental value or mental suffering are not recoverable for loss of animal).
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recoverable. 49 The majority view does not recognize any emotional bond
between companion animals and their owners.5 0 Although some courts
have recognized a unique bond between humans and animals, they still
51
have not allowed damages for pain and suffering.
Most courts, following the majority rule, have not allowed emotional
distress damages for harm to companion animals when the harm was intentional or negligent. 52 They have been reluctant to award emotional
distress damages for fear that such precedent would result in massive litigation or would lead to emotional damage claims for other forms of property. 53 Courts have compared the attachment to a pet as that to a family
heirloom or prized school ring. 54 As one New York court recognized, the
fear is that "[sluch an expansion of the law would place an unnecessary
burden on the ever burgeoning caseloads of the court in resolving serious
tort claims for injuries to individuals." 55 The majority approach, however,
fails to recognize any unique bond that may exist between companion animals and their owners. 56 The courts must determine how to acknowledge
the profound emotional attachment between humans and companion ani49. See Squires-Lee, supra note 7, at 1060-64 (noting courts' reasoning for refusing to allow recovery for emotional suffering); see also Strawser,610 N.E.2d at 612

(explaining limitations on recoverable damages).
50. See Squires-Lee, supra note 7, at 1061-62 (arguing that courts have not
adequately compensated pet owners for loss of their animal). Squires-Lee's fundamental argument is that companion animal owners should be compensated for
their emotional losses because the primary goal of tort law is to require the
tortfeasor to pay all damages proximately caused by his or her conduct. See id. at
1062 (outlining argument for recovery of damages for emotional injuries resulting
from death of pet). Furthermore, Squires-Lee contends that "[a]s long as mental
anguish is compensable in tort, the anguish resulting from the death of a companion animal should also be compensable." Id.
51. See Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 690-91 (Iowa 1996) (recognizing unique bond between humans and their companion animals, but yielding to majority rule that pet owners cannot recover for their emotional suffering
resulting from harm to their pets); Fackler v. Genetzky, 595 N.W.2d 884, 892 (Neb.
1999) ("People may develop an emotional attachment to personal property,
whether animals or inanimate objects with sentimental value, but the law does not
recognize a right to money damages for emotional distress resulting from the negligent destruction of such property.").
52. See FAvRE & BORCHELT, supra note 8, at 60 (explaining judicial reluctance
to award damages for mental pain and suffering for loss of pet).
53. SeeJohnson v. Douglas, 723 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001) (dismissing claims of pet owners for emotional distress and pain and suffering from
witnessing death of their dog).
54. See id. (expressing concern for future recoveries for mental stress caused
by intentional or negligent destruction of other forms of personal property).
55. Id.
56. See Carol L. Gatz, Animal "Rights" and Emotional Distress for Loss of Pet, 43
ORANGE COUNTY LAw. 16, 22 (2001) (noting. that California law still views family
pets as property and does not allow for monetary compensation for any emotional
suffering that may result from loss of pet).
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mals while keeping lawsuits and recoverable damages within manageable
limits. 57

II.
A.

LANDMARK CASES AND STATUTES

Cases Allowing Recovery for Emotional Injuries

1. LaPorte v. Associated Independents, Inc.
In LaPorte v. Associated Independents, Inc.,58 a dog owner filed suit
against a trash collection corporation for maliciously killing her dog. 59 An
employee for the company threw a garbage can at the miniature dachshund while it was tethered outside the dog owner's house. 60 The dog
owner went outside to find her dog injured and dying while the trash col61
lector laughed.
A jury awarded the dog owner $2,000 in compensatory damages and
$1,000 in punitive damages for the malicious killing of her dog.62 The
trial judge instructed the jury that the dog owner also could recover for
her alleged mental distress. 6 3 The appellate court reversed the damages
award because of this jury charge. 64 The Florida Supreme Court granted
the dog owner's writ of certiorari and quashed the appellate court's judg65
ment with directions that the jury award be reinstated.
The court found that the dog owner was entitled to both compensatory and punitive damages for her pain and suffering. 66 The court explicitly stated that "the affection of a master for his dog is a very real thing and
that the malicious destruction of the pet provides an element of damage
for which the owner should recover, irrespective of the value of the
67
animal ....
The LaPortecase is influential because it expanded the damages available to companion animal owners. 68 First, the Florida Supreme Court in
LaPorteheld that a dog owner was entitled to recover for her mental suffer57. For further discussion of suggested proposals for the courts, see infra
notes 178-91 and accompanying text.
58. 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1964).
59. See LaPorte, 163 So. 2d at 267-68 (describing factual basis of lawsuit).
60. See id. at 268 (illustrating events that led to death of dog).
61. See id. (describing dog owner's discovery of her deceased companion
animal).
62. See id. at 267 (setting forth damage award).
63. See id. (explaining jury instructions as stated by trial court).
64. See id. (remanding for new trial on issue of damages).
65. See id. at 269 (determining that finding of appellate court was erroneous).
66. See id. at 268-69 ("It is to us obvious from the facts we have related that the
act performed by the representative of the [trash collection corporation] was malicious and demonstrated an extreme indifference to the rights of the [dog
owner].").
67. Id. at 269 (noting that recovery was irrespective of value).
68. See LaPorte, 163 So. 2d at 269 (expanding damages to include mental suffering and punitive damages for death of plaintiff's companion animal).
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ing as an element of damages for the malicious killing of her dog, a miniature dachshund. 69 Second, the court found that punitive damages were
warranted because the wrongful conduct was malicious and demonstrated
an extreme indifference to the dog owner's rights.

70

This case therefore

paved the way for other courts to allow recovery for emotional suffering
71
resulting from intentional or malicious killing of a companion animal.
2.

Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station

Hawaii has gone further than any other jurisdiction in allowing companion animal owners to recover for emotional suffering. 72 In Campbell v.
Animal Quarantine Station,73 the court upheld a damages award for the

emotional distress a family suffered when its dog was killed by the negligent conduct of a state agency.7 4 Campbell is a landmark case because the
Hawaii Supreme Court permitted the family to recover for its emotional
suffering even though the family members were not present when the dog
75
died, did not witness the wrongful conduct and were never in danger.
In Campbell, the family dog died while being transported to a private
hospital by a state agency. 76 The dog, a nine-year-old female boxer, was
one of seven animals transported in the agency's van to a veterinary hospiand the boxer died
tal. 77 The van did not have proper ventilation devices
78
hospital.
the
at
arriving
after
prostration
of heat
The trial court awarded $1,000 to the family for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. 79 The state agency appealed, claiming that the family
could not recover for emotional injuries because the family did not witness
69. See id. (allowing jury instruction regarding award of damages for mental
suffering).
70. See id. at 268 (finding punitive damages warranted because of nature of
wrongdoer's conduct).
71. See Richardson v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 456 (Alaska
1985) (recognizing cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
for intentional or reckless killing of companion animal); Gill v. Brown, 695 P.2d
1276, 1277 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (allowing recovery for intentional infliction of
emotional distress for killing of plaintiff's donkey). The Second Restatement on
Torts states that "[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes some emotional distress" is liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1964).
72. For further discussion of Hawaii's allowance of emotional suffering to be
included in a damage award for an injury to or death of a companion animal, see
infra notes 73-89 and accompanying text.
73. 632 P.2d 1066 (Haw. 1981).
74. See Campbell, 632 P.2d at 1067 (allowing family to recover emotional distress damages resulting from negligent killing of its dog).
75. See Squires-Lee, supranote 7, at 1079-80 (explaining state modifications of
legal theories to compensate pet owner for loss of animal).
76. See Campbell, 632 P.2d at 1067 (reciting facts of case).
77. See id. (noting that dog was in van for at least one hour).
78. See id. (observing that plaintiffs were notified by phone).
79. See id. (describing lower court's order).
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the tortious event. 80 Furthermore, the agency claimed that the family
could not recover because the family had not presented medical testimony
to substantiate the emotional distress claims and because damages for
mental injuries suffered from the loss of personal property were not
81
recoverable.
The court upheld the damages award and rejected the view that the
family had to witness the negligent conduct to recover.8 2 In addition, the
court found that medical testimony should be used to indicate the degree
of mental distress suffered, but should not act as a bar to recovery. 8 3 The
court concluded that "[m] edical proof can be offered to assist in proving
the 'seriousness' of the claim... but should not be a requirement allowing
or barring the cause of action ....

[T]he duration and symptoms of the

distress affect the amount of recovery."8 4 Finally, the court acknowledged
that it was in the minority in allowing recovery for mental distress suffered
as a result of the negligent destruction of property.8

5

In support of its

position, the court emphasized that even though it had allowed the claim
for the past ten years in other contexts, "the fears of unlimited liability had
86
not prov[en] true."
The Campbell court evidently was sympathetic to the bond between
pets and their owners. 87 While still classifying a companion animal as
property, the court expanded its legal theories to compensate the dog's
family for its full loss.88 This case might be used as a springboard for
other courts to adopt the same or similar legal reasoning to expand the
damages recoverable for the wrongful injury to or death of a companion
89
animal.
80. See id. (describing procedural facts of case).
81. See id. at 1069-71 (stating that family did not see dead animals' body).
82. See id. at 1069 (finding no geographical limitation placed on recovery).

83. See id. at 1070-71 (discussing utilization of medical testimony).
84. Id. at 1071.

85. See id. (acknowledging that by allowing recovery for emotional distress it
was taking unique approach).
86. See id. (offering support for damage award).
87. For further discussion of Campbell, see supra notes 72-86 and accompanying text and infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
88. See Squires-Lee, supra note 7, at 1080 (examining legal reasoning of Campbell court).
89. See Knowles Animal Hosp. v. Wills, 360 So. 2d 37, 38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (upholding jury award that included consideration of dog owners' mental
pain and suffering). In Knowles, dog owners filed suit against an animal hospital
and a veterinarian on the ground that the defendants were grossly negligent in
their treatment of the plaintiffs' dog. See id. (describing facts). The dog suffered
severe burns and disfigurement after being placed on a heating pad and left there
for two hours. See id. (observing that dog eventually had to be put down). Ajury
trial found a verdict and judgment in favor of the dog owners and against the
veterinary hospital for $13,000. See id. (noting jury award). The court upheld the
award stating that "the jury could ... view the negligent conduct which resulted in
the burn injury suffered by the dog to have been of a character amounting to great
indifference to the property of the plaintiffs, such as to justify the jury award." Id.
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B.
1.

Statute Allowing Recovery for Emotional Injuries

Tennessee's T-Bo Act

In 2000, Tennessee became the first state to enact legislation that allows companion animal owners to recover for emotional injuries when
their pets are wrongfully killed.90 The measure allows pet owners to recover up to $4,000 in non-economic damages "[i]f a person's pet is killed
or sustains injuries which result in death caused by the unlawful and intentional, or negligent, act of another ... "9 The statute narrowly defines
"pet" as any "domesticated dog or cat normally maintained in or near the
household of its owner." 92 In addition, the statute only compensates for
loss of expected society, companionship and love and affection of the
companion animal. 93 Moreover, the T-Bo Act includes a provision that
excludes veterinarians from liability for professional negligence. 9 4 Finally,
it includes a geographic limitation that declares that the statute "shall apply only in incorporated areas of any county having a population in excess
95
of seventy-five thousand ....
The T-Bo Act is a positive development for companion animal owners
because it expands available damages. 96 The statute, however, is extremely narrow in scope because of the statutory cap it places on damages,
its coverage of only dogs and cats and its exclusion of veterinarians. 97 Nevertheless, the statute provides a starting point for other states to adopt
98
similar statutes that expand damages in this area of the law.
IV.

POLICY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR VALUING COMPANION
ANIMALS

A.

As MORE THAN PROPERTY

Companion Animals Viewed As Family Members

Courts are reluctant to expand damages in cases involving companion
animals because of the companion animals' classification as property. 99
Nevertheless, there are numerous psychological and policy justifications
demonstrating that courts should value pets more like family members,
90. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (2001) (allowing award of non-economic
damages for harm suffered in connection with death of pet).
91. TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17403(a).

92.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(b).

93. See id. (noting limits on types of damages recoverable pursuant to statute).
94. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17403(e) (emphasizing that statute should not
be "construed to authorize any award of non-economic damages in an action for
professional negligence against a licensed veterinarian").
95.

TENN. CODE ANN. §

44-17403(f).

96. For further discussion of the T-Bo Act's expansion of damages, see supra
notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
97. See Waisman & Newell, supra note 17, at 70-71 (describing limitations of
Tennessee statute).
98. See id. at 68-71 (describing potential impact of statute).
99. See Squires-Lee, supra note 7, at 1060 ("[T]he legal and ethical consequences of that definition are tremendous.").
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giving the courts the flexibility to expand damages. 10 0 Psychological studies examining the relationship between humans and their companion animals reveal that more than seventy percent of pet owners consider their
pets to be a member of the family. 0 1
Pets are viewed as members of the family to the extent that they can
10 2
be anthropomorphized or assigned human thoughts and feelings.
Dogs and cats are most commonly humanized and therefore are most frequently regarded as family members.' 0 3 Pet owners report that a wide
variety of human traits and emotions such as loyalty, trustworthiness, happiness, fear or jealousy can be evidenced in their pets.' 0 4 In addition,
many pet owners agree that their companion animal is able to reciprocate
their love.' 0 5 In fact, some contend that a pet's love is unconditional and
uncritical, resulting in a love superior to that which is sometimes shared
06
between humans.
100. For further discussion of psychological and policy justifications for valuing companion animals as a family member, see supra note 99 and accompanying
text and infra notes 101-22 and accompanying text.
101. See Debra Lynn Stephens & Ronald Paul Hill, The Loss of Animal Companions: A Humanistic and Consumption Perspective, 4 Soc'v & ANiMAts 189, 190 (1996)
(exploring psychological studies that ask pet owners to describe how they view
their pets). These studies, which involve asking pet owners to explain how they
view their pets, were designed to understand the function companion animals play
in their owners' lives. See id. (observing that between seventy and ninety percent of
pet owners view their pets as family members). Results from one investigation
found that as many as ninety-three percent of the respondents viewed their pet as a
member of the family. See id. (reporting statistics from study designed to examine
relationship between humans and their companion animals).
102. See id. at 191 (proposing cultural hierarchy among pet species).
103. See id. (naming species that are considered most easily
anthropomorphized).
104. See Russell W. Belk, Metaphoric Relationships with Pets, 4 Soc'v & ANIMALS
121, 126, 132, 135 (1996) (identifying human traits often assigned to pets). Traditionally, humans "attribute ... characteristics of 'mindedness' [to their animals]
and view them as sharing our emotions. From fables of old to contemporary
comics and advertisements, animals have been portrayed with human characteristics of thought, character and morality." Id. at 123. In a recent investigation, data
was collected through interviews and observations in a veterinary clinic to determine how companion animal owners conceptualize their pets. See Clinton Sanders,
UnderstandingDogs: Caretakers' Attributions of Mindedness in Canine-Human Relationships, 22 J. CoNTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 205, 206-08 (1993) (explaining purpose of
study). Findings revealed that pet owners view their companion animal as "an authentic, reciprocating, and empathetic social actor .... " See id. at 221 (summarizing results of investigation).
105. See Belk, supra note 104, at 126 (concluding that pet owners believe that
their companion animals feel love for them).
106. See id. (suggesting that many pet owners perceive their pet's love to be
unconditional). During an interview with a female cat owner, the cat owner stated
that "[c]ats don't care if [their owner] grows fat, thin, short, etc ..
" Id. This
belief that pets share love unconditionally with humans makes some people actually prefer their relationship with their pet to relationships with other human beings. See, e.g., John Archer, Why Do People Love Their Pets?, 18 EVOLUTION & HUM.
BEHAVIOR 237, 253 (1997) (noting that one individual designated his dog as best
man at his wedding). Because relationships with pets are "largely based on attrib-
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While the tendency to see a companion animal as a member of the
family is pervasive, the role each pet plays in the unique family structure
differs. 10 7 Frequently, companion animal owners view their pets as children and engage in activities that parents often share with their human
children such as playing and speaking in motherese.10 8 Similar to raising
human children, caring for and training pets requires a tremendous investment of time, energy and money. 10 9 In a recent anecdotal study, a
female pet owner described her experience after her dog got an ear infection: "Last summer, [my husband] and I stayed up all night. He took the
first six hours and then I took the rest .... I think we've sort of learned
how to take care of her, just like you do a toddler. . . -110 Given such

investments, it is easy to understand how pet owners become highly attached to their companion animals.
In a cross-cultural survey of pet owners, findings revealed that in addition to being viewed as surrogate children, pets also take on a parental
role, providing security and protection. 1 1' Some respondents also responded that their pet fulfills the role of partner, offering comfort and
emotional support.' 1 2 A pet's status as "family member" is often eviuted positive features [these relationships]... avoid.., conditional and judgmental features that are so inconvenient in human relationships." Id.
107. For further discussion of the different roles companion animals play
within a family structure, see infra notes 111-22 and accompanying text.
108. See Archer, supra note 106, at 241 (summarizing research studies that
examine how people view their relationships with pets). In one study, thirty companion animal owners were asked to describe their significant others, including
their pets, using various adjectives that were provided. See id. (describing study
procedures). Results indicated that respondents most frequently selected the
same adjectives when describing their children and their pets. See id. (analyzing
results of study).
109. See id. at 238 ("[C]ommonplace examples of the enormous amount of
affection, time, and money that people in modem western societies lavish on their
pets.., include offering rewards when they are lost, paying for their grooming and
health care, buying them presents .... ).
110. Belk, supranote 104, at 128. The purpose of this anecdotal study was to
identify themes in human-companion animal relationships. See id. at 123 (stating
goal of research). Forty pet owners were interviewed and asked about their interactions with and feelings towards their pets. See id. (explaining research methods).
The study participants were between the ages of fourteen and sixty-eight and
owned dogs, cats, birds and horses. See id. (describing study sample). Additional
information was gathered by observing pet owners at special events such as dog
obedience shows and pet photography shoots. See id. (reviewing other methods for
gathering data about relationships between pets and humans).
111. See Archer, supra note 106, at 241 (reporting results from survey designed to understand roles pets play in their owners' lives). Some responses that
indicate that pets are viewed as parental figures include: "I enjoy feeling my dog
sitting close to me" and "I hate going home when my dog is not there to greet me."
Id.
112. See id. (describing survey results that show some people view pets like
spouses). Responses that indicate that some pets fulfill the role of a partner include: "When upset or anxious I turn to my dog for comfort." Id.
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denced through its inclusion in family rituals."l 3 One scholar's interviews
with pet owners revealed that companion animals often eat at the same
time as their owners, are assigned their own furnishings or rooms and
often engage in the same activities as human family members.'" 4 In addition, results demonstrated that it is extremely common for pets to be included in family photographs, and many pet owners admit to carrying
pictures of their companion animals in their wallets. 115 Pets are also given
special consideration during holidays and birthdays.1 16 Approximately
seventy percent of companion animal owners celebrate their pet's birthday, and pets often are given holiday presents and treats like other mem1 17
bers of the family.
Companion animals also have been included in their owners' lives
beyond the home. 1 8 A recent Florida newspaper report described the
second annual "National Take Your Dog to Work Day" as a new holiday
designed to "celebrate the human-animal bond and to acknowledge the
frustration of millions of working people who reluctantly leave their pets
home alone every day." 119 Moreover, currently more then two hundred
companies are offering a pet-friendly environment on a regular basis to
improve employee morale. 120 Pet owners who do not have the opportu113. See Belk, supra note 104, at 134 (illustrating how frequently pets participate in family rituals).
114. See id. (providing specific examples of companion animals' involvement
in family activities). One pet owner explained during an interview, "I like to treat
her like one of the members of the family .... I don't mind sharing anything with
her ... if we have steak, I always like to make sure I get enough for her." Id.
115. See id. at 135 (discussing importance people place on including pets in
family photographs). Pet owners seem to agree that without their companion
animal, a family photograph is not complete. See id. (observing that one pet
owner would change photographers if companion animal was not permitted in
picture).
116. See id. (illustrating situations in which pets are included in special
celebrations).
117. See Peggy Noonan, New Tricks for Old Cats and Dogs, Too. Amazing Advances
ProlongingYourLife Now Also Help Your Beloved Pet, USA WEEKEND, May 13, 2001, at 6
(citing statistics regarding number of pet owners who celebrate their animal's
birthday); see also Belk, supra note 104, at 135 (emphasizing pet involvement in
special events). One cat owner was described as "the parent who wants their children to have everything. She gives her cats Christmas presents, and celebrates
their birthdays with a cake, candles, and the whole works." Id.
118. SeeJeanne Malmgren, Wagging While They Work, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,

June 21, 2000, at ID (discussing trend of allowing companion animals to accompany their owners outside home).
119. Id. Although some criticize this "holiday" as being a publicity ploy to
make money off the multi-million dollar pet industry, others believe that allowing
pets to come to work increases employee efficiency and productivity. See id. (discussing reactions to "National Take Your Dog to Work Day").
120. See id. (providing information on companies that allow pet owners to
take their animals to work regularly). An Internet website has been designed to
track the companies that allow pets to accompany their owners to work on a daily
basis. See id. (describing website that tracks "pet-friendly" companies). Approximately twenty-seven percent of these companies fall into the "high-tech" category.
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nity to share the workday with their companion animals can now take advantage of a fast growing industry, pet day care centers. 121 A recent report
disclosed that the demand for pet day care is high, and pet "parents" are
paying between twenty and thirty dollars a day to ensure that their pets
122
have a safe and enjoyable day while they are at work.
B.

Grief Reactions Reflecting Human-Animal Bond

Companion animal owners' reactions to the death of their pet highlights the depth of the human-animal bond and demonstrates that pets
should be viewed by the law as more than property. 123 The degree of grief
experienced over the loss of a pet is an indirect measure of the emotional
connection between humans and their companion animals. 124 In a study
designed to examine the parallels between grief following the loss of a pet
and the loss of a human loved-one, researchers found that eighteen percent of a large, representative sample of adults were unable to carry out
125
their daily life activities during the time following the death of their pet.
See id. (categorizing survey results by type of business). Thirteen percent are petrelated and an another thirteen percent are health care companies. See id. (categorizing survey results by type of business). Additional categories of businesses
include: retail, manufacturing, construction, home repair and government agencies. See id. (categorizing survey results).
121. See Helen Graves, Doggone-To Day Care, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 5, 2000, at 1.
(exploring recent phenomenon of pet day care). Many of the dog day care centers are run much like nursery schools for human children. See id. (describing
typical dog's day at center). Some day care centers even offer transportation for its
clients. See, e.g., id. (listing specific day care center that provides transportation for
their clients' dogs). Once at day care, dogs can engage in a variety of activities
including playing fetch, digging and playing in sprinklers and pools. See id. (detailing day care activities).
122. See id. (describing demand for pet day care services). Most of the clients
at dog day care are "only children" whose parents work all day outside the home.
See id. (discussing reasons for choosing dog day care). Married couples with adult
children at home spend the most money on their pets and are the most frequent
users of this service. See id. (reporting demographics for pet day care clients).
123. See Archer, supra note 106, at 239 (proposing that pet owners' reactions
to death of companion animal can be used to measure attachment).
124. See id. (stating that grief can be used to assess strength of human-pet
attachment).
125. See Mary Stewart, Loss of a Pet-Loss of a Person, in NEW PERSPECTrVES ON
OUR LIvEs WITH COMPANION ANIMALS 390, 390-404 (Aaron Honori Katcher & Alan
M. Beck eds., 1983) (reporting results of study examining similarities in grief reactions following loss of pet and human loved one). The purpose of this study was to
understand how adults react to the death of a pet and to compare this reaction
with that following the loss of a human loved one. See id. at 391 (stating goal of
study). Fifty-two adults were interviewed and asked to write an essay describing
their reaction to a pet's death. See id. (summarizing study procedure). Almost all
of the adult participants in this study had lost a dog, but one had lost a pony and
two others had lost small animals, including a guinea pig and a hamster. See id. at
395 (listing types of pets owned by study participants). Findings revealed that all
adults in the sample experienced some degree of sadness after the loss of a pet,
and approximately one-third reported being "very upset (and often cry[ing] a
lot) . . . [but] still able to carry on with their normal routine." Id.
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Using a scale designed to measure strength of bereavement, researchers
found that the grief responses following the loss of a pet were comparable
to the grief reactions following the loss of a spouse, parent or child.12 6 In
recognition of this grief, a number of pet-loss hotlines have been established to provide emotional support to bereaved pet owners.127
Many pet owners engage in bereavement rituals similar to those following the death of a human friend or relative.1 28 For example, many
individuals choose to bury their deceased pets to establish an enduring
memorial for an important member of the family.1 29 The International
126. See Archer, supra note 106, at 240 (listing studies examining grief response of humans following loss of pet); see also M.K. Gerwolls & S.M. Labott, Adjustment to the Death of a Companion Animal, 7 ANTHROZOOS 172, 173-87 (1994)
(describing long-term study comparing bereavement over pets with bereavement
following loss of human family members). For this study, people who had lost a
pet were asked to complete an adapted version of the Grief Experience Inventory,
a self-report designed to measure human grief. See id. (describing measure used to
assess grief reaction). Further, a survey, designed to examine adult reactions to
the death of a pet, was completed by 242 married couples who had experienced
the death of a pet. See Stephens & Hill, supra note 101, at 193 (describing survey
examining impact of pet deaths). Results from this investigation showed that a
large number of respondents were "quite" or "extremely" distressed by the death
of their pet. See id. (outlining results of survey). Many male respondents stated
that their pet's death was almost "as stressful as the loss of a close friendship" and
"more stressful than children leaving home or getting married." See id. (presenting
common male responses to loss of companion animal). Women who responded to
the survey stated that their pet's death was about "as stressful as losing touch with
their married children, and more stressful than the loss of a close friendship or
children leaving home ....
Id. at 193-94.
127. See Stephens & Hill, supra note 101, at 207 (listing emotional support
services for bereaved pet owners). In 1978, the University of Pennsylvania Veterinary Hospital implemented a social work program that was modeled after social
work facilities in human medical hospitals. See James Quackenbush & Lawrence
Glickman, Social Work Services for Bereaved Pet Owners, in NEW PERSPECTWES ON OUR
LIVEs WITH COMPANION ANIMALS, supra note 125, at 377, 377-404 (describing social
work program established in veterinary hospital). The primary purpose of this
service is to provide short-term interventions with bereaved pet owners. See id. (explaining main goal of service). Four veterinary schools: Tufts University, Michigan
State University, the University of Florida and the University of California at Davis
have established hotlines to support bereaved pet owners. See Stephens & Hill,
supra note 101, at 207 (listing veterinary schools that offer bereavement support).
The International Association of Pet Cemeteries is working to establish a certification program for pet cemetery management that would focus on the bereavement
process and the specific needs of people who are grieving for a pet. See id. (proposing requirements for pet cemetery managers).
128. See Stephens & Hill, supra note 101, at 189 (discussing rituals following
death of pet). Stephens and Hill conducted research to examine how pet owners
respond to the loss of a pet. See id. at 194-95 (noting that data was collected from
pet cemetery users). To collect data, seventy-three participants who had lost a pet
were asked to write an essay detailing their relationship with their companion
animal while focusing on their experience at the pet's death. See id. (outlining
research methodology). In addition, the researchers gathered data at a community pet cemetery by examining the messages engraved on 100 gravestones. See id.
at 194 (describing data collection technique).
129. See id. at 189, 194 (reflecting on growing popularity of pet cemeteries).
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Association of Pet Cemeteries reports that there are over 600 existing pet
130
cemeteries and that new ones are being established almost monthly.
Often, companion animal owners have gravestones engraved with sentiments that reflect feelings of profound love and friendship to further memorialize their pet. 131 Recently, Hallmark, one of the largest and most
popular greeting card manufacturers, recognized the significance of pet
deaths by selling condolence cards for people suffering from the loss of a
companion animal. 13 2 Not all species of pets are mourned with the same
intensity or celebrated with the same bereavement rituals.1 33 These differences reflect "a cultural hierarchy within which pet animals are arrayed."1 34 This distinction between species is determined mainly by the
degree to which the animal may be anthropomorphized or assigned
human characteristics.
V.

13 5

IMPACT OF EXPANDED DAMAGES ON VETERINARY PROFESSION

The classification of companion animals as more than property would
have a tremendous impact on the veterinary profession.' 36 Historically,
130. See id. at 189 (estimating number of existing pet cemeteries).
131. See id. at 195 (discussing themes often found in messages on gravestones
for deceased pets). The messages, which include, "We love you [n]ow and

[f]orever," "To [o]ur [b]eloved [f]riend" and "My love until we meet again," re-

flect the profound relationship between humans and their companion animals.
See id. at 195-96 (reporting messages found on pet gravestones). Other sentiments
in which a pet is referred to as "son," "daughter" or "baby" indicate that pet owners
often view their companion animals as esteemed members of the family. See id. at
197 (recounting epitaphs that reflect pet's status as family member).
132. See Bruce Fogle, The ChangingRoles of Animals in Western Society: Influences
Upon and From the Veterinary Profession, 12 ANTHROzOOs 234, 236 (1999) (exploring
special services designed for pets and pet owners).
133. See Stephens & Hill, supra note 101, at 191 (proposing that different species of pets are mourned with varying intensity). The types of bereavement rituals
following the loss of a pet can reflect the degree of attachment between humans
and animals. See Archer, supra note 106, at 239 (explaining connection between
bereavement and attachment). While some species, specifically dogs and cats, are
often buried or cremated like humans after death, other species, specifically coldblooded vertebrates, are disposed of "down a toilet or in a garbage can." See Stephens & Hill, supra note 101, at 191 (illustrating how different species are often
disposed of).
134. Elizabeth C. Hirschman, Consumers and Their Animal Companions, 20 J.
CONSUMER RES. 616, 624-25 (1994) ("[T]he cold-blooded vertebrates appear to occupy the lowest level of this hierarchy, while birds ...occupy the next higher rung.
Above them come . . . [rodents].

And at the top are the most humanized and

anthropomorphized of animals-cats and dogs.").
135. See id. (providing explanation for hierarchy).
136. SeeJeannie Perron, The Law of Veteriiay Liability and the Human-Animal
Bond, 210J. Am.VETERINARY MED. ASS'N 184, 184-86 (1997) (emphasizing that promotion of human-animal bond may negatively impact veterinary profession). Perron predicts more malpractice or negligence suits against veterinarians or animal
hospitals. See id. at 185 (stating future lawsuits are likely because of litigious climate of American society). She believes most of these future suits will include
claims for mental suffering and loss of companionship. See id. (predicting compo-
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veterinarians have been exposed to very limited liability because of the
law's categorization of companion animals.1 3 7 In general, the market
value approach to damage awards has limited veterinarians' potential liability in malpractice cases.138 Even the landmark cases in this area of the
law have protected veterinarians because they have allowed only non-economic damages when the wrongful conduct was willful, intentional, wanton or grossly negligent. 139 Thus, veterinarians have been shielded from
liability for any emotional harm they may cause to pet owners as a result of
ordinary negligence. 140 Expanded damages in successful veterinary malpractice cases are necessary and justified to permit recovery for emotional
injuries.

141

The existence of the veterinary profession depends on the bond between pet owners and their companion animals. 142 "According to the
American Veterinary Medical Association, the human companions of companion animals spent $11.1 billion on health care for their companion
animals in 1996."14 3 Despite this huge expenditure on animal healthcare,
only one percent of companion animals are covered by pet health insurance. 14 4 Pet owners are willing to pay out-of-pocket veterinary bills because they regard their animals as family members, not as personal
sition of future claims). Furthermore, she hypothesizes that the success of these
suits will hinge on whether plaintiffs make "further progress in persuading courts
that there is innate value in the bond between owner and pet." Id. Perron fears
that the policy statements of veterinary professionals regarding the human-animal
bond could be used against the profession in these lawsuits. See id. (fearing policy
statements of those in veterinary profession could be used as evidence).
137. See FAvRE & BORCHELT, supra note 8, at 233 (discussing reasons why veterinary malpractice lawsuits are at minimum level).
138. See id. ("One factor which has kept the number of lawsuits at a minimum
level in the past is the low amount of damages awarded for the injury to animals.").
139. For further discussion of landmark cases, see supra notes 58-89 and accompanying text.
140. See Harold W. Hannah, Emotional Distress, Punitive Damages, and the Veteri-

narian-SomeJudicialResponses, 216J. AM.

VETERINARY MED.

Ass'N 25, 25-26 (2000)

(recognizing that recovery for emotional distress has only been allowed in cases
where claims are based on more than ordinary negligence). Hannah contends
that allowing recovery for emotional distress in addition to market value would
create "chaos in the ... companion animal marketplace." Id. at 26.
141. See Steven M. Wise, Recovery of Common Law Damagesfor Emotional Distress,
Loss of Society, and Loss of Companionshipfor the Wrongful Death of a CompanionAnimal
4 ANiMAL L. 33, 47-48 (1998) (justifying pet owners' rights to recover for pain and
suffering in veterinary malpractice cases).

142. See FRANCIONE, supra note 31, at 54 ("The veterinary profession has benefited enormously from an increase in animal ownership and from the fact that
animal owners now seek a higher level of care, including preventive treatment,
than they did in the past.").
143. Wise, supra note 141, at 46.
144. See Hager, supra note 2, at J2 (noting small amount of pet owners who
purchase pet health insurance).
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property. 14 5 As one commentator noted, "[i]f the economic value of companion animals was important... as is normally the case with sofas, chairs,
and other inanimate property, small animal veterinarians would close
their doors, because human companions would never bring their companion animals for treatment. 1 46 Veterinarians formally recognize the emotional bond between humans and their pets.'

47

Thus, veterinarians

should be required to compensate pet owners for destroying this bond
when they engage in malpractice. 148 Total compensation can only be accomplished through allowance of damages for emotional distress and loss
of companionship. 149 Because the veterinary profession reaps substantial
benefits from the human-animal bond, it is logical and equitable that veterinarians absorb the total costs when they commit malpractice.' 5 0
Many veterinarians warn that expansion of damages in veterinary malpractice cases would lead to a drastic increase in the cost of malpractice
insurance. 151 They argue that the cost of veterinary care would rise "beyond the means of some pet owners."' 52 This fear relies on the assumption that "allowing pet owners to claim loss of companionship and
53
infliction of [emotional] distress encourages unnecessary lawsuits.'
Moreover, this "litigation fear" is compounded by the fact that many veterinarians believe that damage awards would rise beyond reason because of
54
the speculative and intangible nature of emotional injuries.'
145. See generally FRANciONE, supra note 31, at 54 ("It is obvious that humans
who have these relationships with animals do not regard them merely as personal

property.").
146. Wise, supra note 141, at 47.
147. See Perron, supra note 136, at 184 (noting that veterinary profession has
promoted bond between humans and companion animals).
148. See Wise, supra note 141, at 47 (analyzing compensation in veterinary
malpractice cases).
149. See id. at 47-48 (justifying pet owners' claims to pain and suffering
damages).

150. See Williamson v. Prida, 75 Cal. App. 4th 1417, 1424-25 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (discussing standard of care in veterinary malpractice cases). The Williamson
court emphasized the majority rule that the standard of care for veterinarians is
the same as it is for medical doctors. See id. (discussing standard of care). "In
medical malpractice cases, the established rule is that a doctor must exercise the
degree of skill or care usual in the profession .

. .

. We find that this standard

applies to veterinary malpractice cases, as well." Id.; see alsoJoseph H. King, Jr., The
Standard of Carefor Veterinariansin Medical MalpracticeClaims, 58 TENN. L. REv. 1, 2-6
(1990) (exploring veterinary malpractice liability and comparing it to medical malpractice claims).
151. See Willing, supra note 1, at 1A (explaining stance of critics who oppose
allowing pet owners to recover for loss of companionship and emotional distress).
152. No Need to Change the Status of Pet, supra note 14, at B6.
153. Willing, supra note 1, at IA.
154. See generally Waisman & Newell, supra note 17, at 65-68 (analyzing arguments against permitting recovery of non-economic damages for injury to or death
of companion animal).
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The concerns of the veterinary profession are valid. 155 It is clear that
changing the classification of companion animals and allowing non-economic damages would have a substantial effect on the profession. 156 Traditionally, low damage awards have kept veterinary malpractice lawsuits at
a minimum.1 5 7 Thus, an increase in the value of companion animals
would increase the number of lawsuits filed. 158 The critical issue is
whether the rise in the number of lawsuits should be considered a nega59
tive consequence.'
The function of law is to adapt to the ever-changing views of society. 160 Research supports society's recognition of the human-animal
bond. 16 1 Medical and veterinary professionals also support the strength of
the human-animal bond. 162 Moreover, companion animals are becoming
more like family members in American culture.' 63 The law must reflect
this valuation and "continue along the evolutionary path toward laws that
respect and uphold the value of human-animal relationships." 164 While
expanding damages would inevitably lead to a rise in veterinary malpractice lawsuits, this result would merely be a reaction to the law's recognition
155. For a further discussion of the effect of an expansion of damages on the
veterinary profession, see infra notes 156-59.
156. Cf Companion Animal Wrongful Death or Injury Cases-An Introduction,
Animal Legal Defense Fund, at http://www.aldf.org/damages.htm (last visited
Aug. 25, 2001) (outlining current status of law in companion animal wrongful
death or injury cases).
157. See id. (explaining reasons for low damage awards).
158. SeeJulie Scelfo, Good Dogs, Bad Medicine?; More Pet Owners Sue for Malpractice-And Win, NEWSWEEK, May 21, 2001, at 52 (examining current state of veterinary malpractice lawsuits). Lawsuits will increase as the practice of animal law
becomes more widely recognized. See Charles Toutant, Animal Lawyers Do It for
Love: Don't Call It a Niche Specialty, But There's Work for Attorneys in the Many-Sided,
Evolving Law ofInterspeciesRelationships, 159 N.J. L.J. 1049, 1049-50 (2000) ("Animal
law is a small but growing sideline specialty practiced by a band of New Jersey
attorneys who enjoy vindicating the rights of four-legged clients, even though the
cases are unlikely to make them rainmakers anytime soon.").
159. Cf Wise, supra note 141, at 47 (discussing accountability of veterinarians
in malpractice cases).
160. Cf Waisman & Newell, supra note 17, at 73 (noting that law came to
recognize that recovery for spousal and parent/child loss of consortium was necessary based on "logic, compassion and modern sensitivit[ies]").
161. For a further discussion of research supporting the human-animal bond,
see supra notes 99-135 and accompanying text.
162. See Perron, supra note 136, at 185-86 (warning veterinarians that promotion of human-animal bond may lead to large damages awards in veterinary malpractice cases).
163. For further discussion of evidence supporting proposition that companion animals should be valued as family members, see supra notes 99-135 and accompanying text.
164. See Chrisanne Beckner, Pain and Suffering (May 31, 2001), at http://
www.newsreview.com/issues/Sacto/2001-05-31 /news.asp (last visited Jan. 20,
2002) (discussing challenge to notion that pets are merely property).
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of the strength of the human-animal bond.165 Pet owners would have
more incentive to bring lawsuits because the damage awards would not be
limited to the market value of the animal. 16 6 The possibility of increased
lawsuits in the veterinary malpractice arena should not stand as a barrier
to pet owners who seek to recover for the injury to or loss of their compan67
ion animal.'
The number of veterinary malpractice lawsuits that likely would surface and the amount of future damage awards is unpredictable given that
so few of these claims have been filed because of companion animals' classification as property. t 68 Indeed, it is possible that the rise in claims will
necessitate at least a slight increase in veterinary malpractice insurance
premiums.1 69 Whether a rise in veterinarian fees will be necessary is debatable considering that veterinarians "typically pay less than $200 a year
for $1 million of [malpractice] coverage." 170 Because three-fourths of the
small animal veterinary practices in the United States gross $300,000 to
$500,000 per year, and almost one-quarter gross more than $750,0000, it
seems shocking that veterinarians would not be able to absorb the in1 71
creased insurance premiums.
Moreover, even if veterinarians decided to raise fees, pet owners
would have alternatives to pay for the healthcare of their animals. 172 Pet
owners could purchase health insurance for their animals just as they do
for their own children and family members. 173 Currently, there are pet
insurance policies that cover everything from unexpected surgeries to routine visits. 174 In fact, some companies, including AT&T, are beginning to

offer veterinary health insurance to their employees as a payroll deduc165. See Kristen Convery, Lawyer Files Suit Against Xenia, Ohio, Animal Hospital
on Behalf of Poodle, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 19, 2001, at Al (describing one lawyer's fight to change valuation of companion animals in Ohio).
166. See FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 8, at 233 (predicting rise in number of
lawsuits if value of companion animals is enhanced).
167. Cf Waisman & Newell, supra note 17, at 66-67 (answering claim that allowance of non-economic damages would lead to multiplicity of lawsuits and protracted litigation).
168. See FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 8, at 233 (discussing minimal amount
of veterinary malpractice lawsuits).
169. See No Need to Change the Status of Pet, supra note 14, at B6 (predicting
upgrade in status of pets would increase cost of malpractice insurance).
170. Willing, supra note 1, at IA.
171. See Wise, supra note 141, at 46 (noting survey published by American
Hospital Association concerning veterinary fees and revenues).
172. See Mary Bridgman, Now You Can Buy Insurancefor Fido, Fluffy, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, July 15, 2001, at IC (explaining role of veterinary health insurance in
United States).
173. See id. (describing how one pet owner uses his pet insurance policy frequently on his two dogs).
174. See id. ("The policy covers unexpected surgeries and medical treatments
as well as routine veterinary care.").
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tion. 175 The trend towards veterinary health insurance is already underway in this country. 176 Pet owners could rely on this insurance if
veterinarians raised fees as a result of increased lawsuits and damage
17 7
awards.
VI.

A.

PROPOSALS FOR COURTS AND LEGISLATURES

How Courts Can Ensure the Appropriate Valuation of Companion Animals

Courts must recognize that the law's categorization of companion animals as property is archaic and does not reflect society's values or expectations. 178 Removing the "property" label will give the courts more
flexibility to expand the damages recoverable for the injury to or death of
a companion animal. 179 The process of expanding recoverable damages
will take numerous years because the law is well established in most
jurisdictions.' 80
First, courts must recognize that the market value approach does not
adequately compensate many companion animal owners whose pets have
been injured or killed through wrongful conduct.1 81 Courts should focus
175. See id. (noting manner in which AT&T uses pet health insurance as employee benefit).
176. See id. (explaining recent business success of largest provider of veterinary health insurance). This dependence on insurance is necessary as pet owners
spend more on veterinary care. See Catherine Trevison, The Cost of Puppy Love,
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Mar. 29, 2001, at C1 (finding that money spent on veterinary care has grown faster than overall consumer spending). One study reported
that the "average cutoff for 'economic euthanasia'-the point at which owners decide that the cost of treatment has grown too high-is rising, from $576 in 1997 to
$795 [in 2000]." Id.
177. Cf Bridgman, supra note 172, at 1C (offering reasons for growing popularity of pet health insurance).
178. See Waisman & Newell, supra note 17, at 57-62 (summarizing society's
recognition of human-animal bond). Waisman and Newell point out that animals
were domesticated as long as 14,000 years ago. See id. at 57 (describing history of
human-animal bond). Recognition of the bond has dramatically increased in the
last two decades. See id. at 58 (discussing human-animal bond). For example, in
March 2000, a motorist threw a dog named Leo to his death in heavy San Jose
traffic because of a road rage incident. See id. at 62 (encouraging nationwide support for prosecuting motorist). In response, the Washington Post ran a headline
story of the incident and donations amounting to $120,000 were received in order
to help find and criminally convict the perpetrator. See id. (reciting story of Leo's
death).
179. Cf Gatz, supra note 56, at 17 ("Animals have been considered property,
specifically 'chattel', both at English common law and here in America, and therefore owners whose animals have been harmed are limited to recovering only the
financial cost of replacing 'beasts.' That may be legally changing.").
180. See Barton & Hill, supra note 24, at 411 (noting that all reported cases
have categorized companion animals as personal property).

181. See Squires-Lee, supra note 7, at 1081-82 (making compensation argument for allowing recovery of emotional suffering). Squires-Lee contends it is inconsistent for the tort system not to compensate a pet owner for the emotional
pain from the death of a companion animal because it is widely accepted that
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on the actual value of companion animals to their owners on a case by case
basis. 18 2 The presumption should be that the market value approach is
insufficient to compensate pet owners and that the actual value of the pet
to its owner is the most efficient benchmark.' 83 Pet owners would continue to have the burden of establishing this value through personal and
expert testimony. 184 Calculations should include factors such as pedigree,
purchase price, special ability or training and the age and general health
of the animal. 18 5 In addition, the actual value should include a consideration of any emotional connection the owner had with his or her animal
and recognition of any sentimental value that was lost.186 The wrongdoer

could present evidence that reflects unfavorably on the value of the pet,
including evidence of poor training, lack of pedigree and disproof of any
human-animal bond.

18 7

Second, courts should recognize separate causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of companionship.' 88 Pet owners would have to present
expert testimony proving any emotional damage suffered from the injury
to or loss of their pet.' 8 9 This requirement would decrease the risk of
frivolous lawsuits. 190 Clearly, wrongdoers could present evidence to disprove that pet owners suffered emotional damage or had an emotional
attachment to their animals.' 9 ' After removing the property label from
companion animals, courts would have more flexibility to recognize these
causes of action.
mental suffering results from the death of a pet. See id. at 1082-83 (describing

compensation goal of tort law).
182. For further discussion of actual value approach, see supra notes 33-39
and accompanying text.
183. See generally Barton & Hill, supra note 24, at 420 (discussing advantages of
actual value approach).
184. See Veterinary Malpractice Is Common: Pet GuardiansNeed Better Protection by
Our Laws, at http://www.geocities.com/amorchien2000/index.html (last visited

Aug. 25, 2001) (emphasizing need for expert witnesses in veterinary malpractice
cases).
185. See FAvRE & BORCHELT, supra note 8, at 54 (discussing common elements
of damages).
186. See Brousseau v. Rosenthal, 443 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980)
(allowing loss of companionship to be component of actual value of pet).
187. See FAvRE & BORCHELT, supra note 8, at 54 ("[D] efendant may present his
own evidence as to the market value of the animal ....").
188. Cf Waisman & Newell, supra note 17, at 74 (suggesting that legislatures
must begin to permit recovery for non-economic damages).
189. See Veterinary Malpractice Is Common, supra note 184, at http://
(discussing need for expert
www.geocities.com/amorchien2000/index.html
testimony).
190. Cf Willing, supra note 1, at 1A (expressing fear of unnecessary lawsuits).

191. Cf Squires-Lee, supra note 7, at 1095 ("Despite the difficulty of measuring emotional damages ... once courts acknowledge that the emotional harms
wrought by the tortious death of a companion animal must be compensated, the
opportunity exists to establish a comprehensive, fair, and practical method for determining the amount of damage awards.").

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002

25

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 4

448

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

B.

[Vol. 47: p. 423

How Legislatures Can Ensure the Appropriate Valuation of
Companion Animals

State legislatures can force a change in this area of the law much
faster than the courts. 192 Legislatures should use Tennessee's T-Bo statute
as a model and adopt similar statutes that permit recovery of non-economic damages for the wrongful injury to or death of a companion
animal.' 93 These statutes could preempt the settled case law and provide
remedies for emotional suffering and loss of companionship.' 9 4 Other
states should modify Tennessee's statute to include: (1) an expanded definition of "pet" to include a wider variety of animals, beyond a domesticated dog or cat; (2) increased limits on non-economic damages beyond
$4,000; (3) no limits on types of non-economic damages available; (4) recovery of non-economic damages for injury to companion animal that
does not result in death; (5) no exclusion of veterinarians in professional
malpractice suits; and (6) no geographical limitation on where the statute
applies. 95

The statute should include a broader definition of "pet" because
humans can form companion relationships with animals besides dogs and
cats, including birds and rabbits.' 96 In addition, a $4,000 limit on noneconomic damages is extremely low considering the amount of damages
awarded in modern courts and because of high litigation costs.' 97 Moreo192. Cf Waisman & Newell, supra note 17, at 74 (urging that legislatures act
to promote change).
193. See id. (describing impact of Tennessee's statute).
194. For further discussion of the settled case law, see supra notes 24-43 and

accompanying text.
195. See Waisman & Newell, supra note 17, at 70-71 (discussing limitations of
Tennessee's statute). For further discussion of Tennessee's T-Bo Act, see supra
notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
196. See Nienke Endenburg, The Attachment of People to Companion Animals, 8
ANTHROZOOs 83, 87 (1995) (comparing mean attachment coefficients for different
pet species); see also R. Lee Zasloff, MeasuringAttachment to Companion Animals: A

Dog Is Not a Cat Is Not a Bird, 47

APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV.

ScI. 43, 46-47 (1996)

(describing results from study using assessment tool called Comfort from Companion Animals Scale to measure attachment to various species of pets). Results from
this study indicate that other measures designed to assess the human-animal bond
provide an inaccurate description of the attachment between certain pet species
and their owners. See id. at 46 (critiquing human-animal attachment measures).
Although dogs and cats typically engage in more activities with their owners, other
small pets including birds and rabbits can provide psychological fulfillment. See id.
at 46-47 (proposing that many pets, regardless of species, share close bond with
their owners). Zasloff explains that "there are commonalties in the emotional experience of having a close and caring relationship with a pet, irrespective of the
animal's species." Id. at 47.
197. Cf Lisa Sink, Man Ordered to Pay $7,500 for PoisoningNeighbors'Dogs, MiWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 13, 2000, at 15B (describing jury verdict where man was
ordered to pay $7,500 in punitive damages for killing his neighbors' dogs with
antifreeze-soaked meat). The owners were not satisfied with the verdict because
they urged the jury to award at least $100,000 in punitive damages. See id. (noting
dog owners' original claims). The dog owners sought the high punitive award
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ver, the types of non-economic damage awards available to harmed pet
owners should be left to the discretion of the courts and not limited by
statute. 198 Furthermore, non-economic damages should be attainable in
cases where companion animals are purely injured.' 99 Also, as discussed
earlier, there is no justification for excluding veterinarians from increased
damage awards. 200 Finally, the geographical limitation is not necessary because population size cannot accurately predict how individuals within
20
communities value their companion animals.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The law's categorization of a companion animal as merely property
has limited damages recoverable for pet owners in cases where their
animal is wrongfully injured or killed. 20 2 This classification does not accurately reflect societal views relating to the human-animal bond. 20 3 Public
attitudes and psychological evidence indicate that in our society pets are
20
thought of more as family members than as inanimate objects.

4

Courts and legislatures must change this characterization of companion animals, and in turn expand the damages available to pet owners
whose animals have been injured or killed through intentional, reckless or
negligent conduct. 20 5 Pet owners should be compensated for any emo-

because a lower court had dismissed their claim of damages for emotional distress.
See id. (describing dog owners' dissatisfaction with $7,500 damage award and Wisconsin's categorization of companion animals).
198. See Waisman & Newell, supra note 17, at 70 (suggesting that Tennessee's

statute allow recovery for other reasonable damages).
199. See id. at 71 (arguing that pet owners should not be foreclosed from recovery of non-economic damages in cases where injuries to animals do not result
in death).
200. For further discussion of veterinarian liability, see supra notes 136-77 and
accompanying text.
201. Cf

BRUCE FOGLE,

INTERRELATIONs

BETWEEN

PEOPLE AND

PETS

29-35

(1981) (exploring diverse categories of pet ownership and values and attitudes
that characterize each category).
202. See FRANCIONE, supra note 31, at 55 (recognizing that domestic animals
are still considered personal property and noting that remedies for negligence
must be understood in this light).
203. For further discussion of societal views of the human-animal bond, see
supra notes 99-135 and accompanying text.
204. For further discussion of psychological evidence that supports the
strength of the human-animal bond, see supra notes 99-135 and accompanying
text.
205. See Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1979) (awarding dog owner $700 in damages for shock, mental anguish
and despondency she suffered due to wrongful destruction and loss of her dog's
body). In Corso, a dog owner was forced to have her fifteen-year-old poodle
euthanized by a veterinarian. See id. at 182-83 (describing factual basis of case).
The owner agreed with the veterinarian that the dog's body would be turned over
to an animal funeral arranger. See id. at 183 (discussing facts). Subsequently, the
veterinarian failed to turn over the remains of the dog to the funeral arranger. See
id. (establishing facts). The owner arranged an elaborate funeral for the deceased
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tional suffering or loss of companionship that results from wrongful conduct against their companion animal. 20 6 In addition, punitive damage
awards should be mandatory in cases where injury to the animal is willful,
wanton or reckless. 20 7 Such a change in the law will likely take time and
will likely vary across jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the gradual expansion of
potential damages is justified and necessary to ensure the appropriate legal valuation of companion animals.
William C. Root

dog that included the purchase of a head stone and involvement of her family. See
id. (setting forth facts). At the funeral, a casket was opened, at which time the
owner discovered the body of dead cat instead of her dog's body. See id. (describing factual basis of case). The discovery caused the woman tremendous mental
distress and anguish. See id. (describing effect of mistake on plaintiff). The court
allowed the woman to recover beyond the market value of the animal because it
viewed the dog as more than just personal property. See id. (valuing companion
animals as more than property). "This court now overrules prior precedent and
holds that a pet is not just a thing but occupies a special place somewhere in between a person and a piece of personal property." Id. Most courts have not
adopted the Corso court's view on the valuation of companion animals. See Wise,
supra note 141, at 93 (arguing that current laws compensate pet owners for economic loss that is not suffered and fails to compensate for emotional losses that are
actually suffered).
206. See Page, supra note 14, at 20 (explaining argument of those who favor
increased valuations of companion animals).
207. See Waisman & Newell, supra note 17, at 70 (delineating situations in
which punitive damages should be awarded for harm to companion animals).
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